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Reviews
How Literature Plays with the Brain: The Neuroscience of  
Reading and Art, by Paul B. Armstrong; 221 pp. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.
What gives particular objects and performances the qualities that lead to their categorization as “art”? In literary studies, recent theoretical 
approaches that emphasize sociocultural context have dampened enthusiasm 
for inquiry into the aesthetic, not simply directing attention elsewhere but 
frequently asserting that the entire category is the constructed handmaiden of 
sociopolitical power. But this decades-long eschewal of the aesthetic has perhaps 
had its day. In How Literature Plays with the Brain: The Neuroscience of Reading and 
Art, Paul B. Armstrong notes this neglect and proposes that neuroscience offers 
some important insights into aesthetic activity.
The goal of Armstrong’s book is to demonstrate the correlation between 
aesthetic activity and brain structure and function. Relating this goal in his 
introductory chapter, Armstrong notes—in a nod to Norman Holland, one 
of the fathers of cognitive literary studies—that the significant explanatory 
gap between neuroscience and literary analytical practices limits the former 
as an interpretive tool. Nevertheless, in Armstrong’s view, neuroscience is far 
enough advanced for scholars to draw inferences about the literary reading 
process. Moreover, the new field of neurophenomenology is continuous with the 
speculative tradition of Continental phenomenology and with reader response 
theory, fields to which Armstrong links his observations through the book.  In 
his words, “the correlations between neural and phenomenological accounts 
of the temporality of cognition as nonlinear, horizonal, and reciprocal have 
important parallels not only in Heidegger’s description of the hermeneutic 
circle as a structure of anticipation but also in Iser’s conception of reading as 
a to-and-fro process of consistency building” (p. 21). 
Armstrong posits that, while the aesthetic tradition has often, contradictorily, 
sought the essence of art in harmony on the one hand and disunity on the other, 
the interplay between harmony and disunity is at the core of aesthetic response. 
Because it emphasizes the brain’s fundamental plasticity, in Armstrong’s view, 
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neuroscience confirms the insights of phenomenology and the psychological 
tradition of William James.
Thus, in chapters two through four, Armstrong ties findings about cognitive 
and perceptual functions to the concept of play, broadly conceived. Noting at 
the outset that reading is not directly linked to perception (sight or hearing), 
Armstrong reviews research on reading and language, demonstrating that 
language processing is not on the whole a localized activity. Following neurosci-
entists including Francisco Varela and Stanislas Dehaene, Armstrong promotes 
the notion of a highly plastic, or “bushy,” brain with many connections between 
diverse areas and much flexibility of function. Sensibly inferring from this that 
“a ‘bushy,’ decentered brain would not be likely to have aesthetic experiences 
located in only one area of the cortex,” Armstrong supports his claim with 
neuroimaging studies (p. 42). Following contemporary work in neuroaesthetics 
as well in insisting that aesthetic processing is not categorically distinct from 
other kinds of processing, Armstrong speculates that “the ways in which art’s 
harmonies reinforce or rewire neuronal assemblies may have a distinct impact 
on modes of perception and cognition in everyday life” (p. 47).
In this manner, Armstrong moves from the complexity and plasticity of brain 
processes to inferences about aesthetic function. Thus, the “to-and-fro process 
of consistency building” mirrors the functionality of the brain. For instance, 
distinct brain areas process different aspects of vision (immediate stimulus, 
orientation, shape, and color), and this fact, along with the evidence of optical 
illusions and experiments in word recognition, points to the interplay between 
perception and cognition that constitutes seeing. The evidence that the brain 
is open to ambiguity and plays with divergent syntheses of visual information 
harmonizes with Elkhonon Goldberg’s research on novelty, which suggests that 
cortical areas dedicated to routine and to open-ended operations are simultane-
ously activated in the experience of novelty. 
From this, Armstrong surmises that art and the aesthetic break predictability 
by engaging in a to-and-fro of routine and novelty. Extending this argument 
further, Armstrong claims that the brain’s temporality is connected to the capac-
ity for play. Rather than experiencing life as sequential moments, humans are 
future directed and engage in “perceptual framing,” that is, erasing temporal 
differences in what they experience as discrete episodes. Armstrong connects 
perceptual framing with Husserl’s notion of protentional and retentional hori-
zons, the bounded conceptualizations of past and present used to frame and 
organize experience. Furthermore, Armstrong points out that this experience 
of temporality, and particularly its bias to the future, coheres with Antonio 
Damasio’s “as if” body loop, which explains how, through emotional priming, 
specifically imaginative responses can occur.
Armstrong’s final chapter reviews research on human social responsiveness 
and on the controversies surrounding it, including theory of mind, simula-
tion theory, and mirror neuron theory. He reminds us that reading is action, 
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simulated through “as if” experience, and originating in the strong capacity 
for imitation that begins in childhood. The to-and-fro that takes place in the 
brain, then, is consistent with the concept of language as a form of action that 
supports the social functions of mimesis: “The temporality of language and the 
temporality of original experience can play off each other … because they are 
different modes of action” (p. 154).
In stressing that imaginative experience is dynamic action seemingly con-
stituted in brain processes that are in many respects similar to those of direct 
experience, Armstrong has embarked on a model of aesthetic understanding that 
gives the arts a central role in human existence. Armstrong legitimately notes 
that cognitive literary criticism has thus far made little use of neuroscience, and 
his clear and organized presentation of the scientific material throughout the 
book provides readers with a coherent guide to the current research relevant to 
aesthetic experience. Like G. Gabrielle Starr’s Feeling Beauty: The Neuroscience of 
Aesthetic Experience, Armstrong’s book is quite different from traditional literary 
critical fare, with its twin emphases on textual interpretation and literary his-
tory. He manages to negotiate the explanatory gap between discrete scientific 
findings and theoretical claims with clarity and tact, and, given the infancy of 
neuroaesthetics, his circumspect avoidance of sweeping connections between 
brain processes and interpretive acts is wise.
Armstrong might underscore the importance of his book by extending its 
insights in a few additional directions. For instance, a historical discussion of 
the emergence of phenomenology and, further, of its relation to American 
pragmatism—which grew directly out of evolutionary and scientific thinking—
would clarify the justification for an emphasis on philosophy in an otherwise 
scientifically oriented book. Indeed, given his explicit (and accurate) recogni-
tion of the impact of William James on subsequent academic psychology, his 
neglect of American pragmatism is somewhat surprising. Iser’s concept of the 
“to-and-fro process of consistency building” accords with Jamesian pragmatic 
epistemology, which conceives of knowledge construction as an ongoing nego-
tiation between abstract ideas and contingent facts. In other words, pragmatism 
has itself worked in a to-and-fro epistemological engagement with science over 
the past two centuries, and Continental phenomenology evinces a convergent 
emphasis on the situated, processive nature of cognition. Likewise, Husserl’s 
concept of protentional and retentional horizons and the neuroscientific notion 
of perceptual framing correlate intriguingly with John Dewey’s notion of the 
aesthetic as segmented, perceived experience.
Additionally, although Armstrong’s book itself cycles recursively toward the 
why of the aesthetic in its explanation of the how, it never overtly places the 
mechanics of neuroaesthetics within a larger explanatory framework. Unlike 
many cognitive theorists, Armstrong does not shy away from evolutionary 
explanations (a convenient means of avoiding ideological conflict in literary 
studies), and he generally views the brain’s overwhelming plasticity as well as 
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the constraints on flexibility as evolved phenomena. Integration of his argu-
ment into a functional explanation for the evolution of culture, like those 
presented by Merlin Donald and Steven Mithen, would enforce his audience’s 
understanding of why such evolutionarily expensive behavior as art production 
and consumption not only exists but also has been and likely still is epistemi-
cally and socially indispensable in the career of the species.
Of course, no one can do everything in one book, and Armstrong’s current 
contribution is of central importance in its cogent articulation of what science 
is now finding out about how art is processed by the brain. At present, when 
so many universities would gleefully discard the study of the arts in the service 
of a utilitarian turn in higher education, the evidence that Armstrong provides 
for their vital cognitive function and the coherence with which he presents that 
evidence is indeed both welcome and timely.
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